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1. Introduction 
 
Central and Eastern European countries have undergone profound political, economic 
and social transformations during the 1990s. One of the consequences of such 
transformations was a large increase in income inequality. This is quite 
understandable; in the socialist and communist regimes wages were mostly set 
administratively, so that wage dispersion was quite compressed. With a dismantling of 
the old regime, market forces became a more decisive factor in wage setting and this 
invariably resulted in an increase in wage inequality. Of course, an analysis of 
inequality of market incomes does not provide the whole picture, as the increase in 
inequality of market incomes was moderated by the progressive personal income tax 
and by the system of social transfers. In this sense, an analysis of the inequality of 
disposable income provides a better indication of the changes in welfare levels. Here, 
households have to be taken as the unit of analysis. 
 
The analysis which we present here is confined to incomes of wage-earners, of which 
earnings represent close to 98 per cent. Other active persons, such as self-employed, 
farmers, occasional workers and unpaid family members will not be included in the 
analysis. So, clearly, we will not be getting the whole “story” of income growth and 
income inequality. Blinder (1993, p. 308), referring to the US, said that “if you want 
to understand the rise in income inequality in the 1980s, the place to start is with the 
rise in wage inequality”. Atkinson (1998, p. 19) commented on Blinder’s remark, 
stating: “I agree, but one should not stop here”. While we certainly agree with 
Atkinson’s remark, we reiterate that we will not move much further from the analysis 
of wage inequality, with the additional exploration of the effects of the personal 
income tax and mandatory social contributions on the after-tax income of wage 
earners. 
 
 
2. The Data Sources 
 
We have at our disposal three data sources on wages, two of which are not generally 
available, but were obtained from the Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia 
(SORS) and the Tax Authority of the Republic of Slovenia (TARS). 
 
Data source A 
 
This data source was obtained from the SORS and consists of tabulated data of total 
annual income (subdivided into 10 different income categories). There are 15 income 
brackets. For this grouping, the SORS used the personal income tax database and the 
statistical registry of the active population, for which the SORS is the “custodian”. 
Only persons fulfilling the following criteria were considered: (1) employed full-time 
(meaning that information in the registry stated that they worked at least 36 hours per 
week) and (2) employed with the same employer throughout the given year. The data 
are in the form of tables, with separate tables for employees with regard to the sector 
of activity (public, private) and gender. Thus, for each year there are four tables (men 
employed in public sector, women employed in public sector, men employed in 
private sector, and women employed in private sector). This data source also includes 
data on withheld PIT and employee social contributions. Data are available from 1993 
onwards. 
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Data source B 
 
This data source was obtained from the Tax Authority of the Republic of Slovenia. It 
is a large simple random sample, containing annual data from the personal income tax 
database. Each sample consists of some 60,000 taxpayers, i.e. some 5 per cent of all 
PIT taxpayers. The data contain the age of taxpayer, gender, the amount of various 
income sources, withheld PIT and social contributions. Unlike data source A, data 
source B also contains the final amount of PIT paid. This data source starts from 
1991. 
 
Data source C 
 
This data source is based on the official publication of the SORS, Rapid Reports: 
Persons in paid employment by amount of gross earnings and collective agreements. 
These reports are published annually and provide the distribution of gross wages for 
September of each year. The number of income brackets is 20. Only employees who 
worked full time in September were considered. Gross earnings also include various 
wage-related disbursements, such as wage compensation for annual leave, sickness 
pay for the first 30 days1, and payments for overtime. However, some important 
wage-related income sources are not included, such as allowance for annual vacation. 
Also not included are income sources which are not wage related, such as income 
from contractual work. Up to 2005, the statistical survey did not include (a) private 
enterprises with at most 2 employees and (2) employees working for self-employed 
entrepreneurs. Starting from 2005, private enterprises were being included in the 
survey. It must be mentioned that these two groups of employees are not negligible; in 
2005 the first group represented some 5 per cent, whereas the second group 
represented some 9 per cent of all employees. These surveys of monthly earnings for 
September of each year have been regularly carried out prior to 1991. However, 
comparisons between the post-1991 and pre-1991 period are not meaningful, as the 
concept of “gross wage” did not exist and therefore only net wages were recorded in 
the pre-1991 (socialist) period. 
 
Clearly, each of the three data sources has its advantages and disadvantages. In view 
of Atkinson’s A/B/C classification (Atkinson, 2007) one is tempted to classify all the 
three data sources as high-quality data, i.e. as an “A” classification. Of course, none of 
these data sources are ideal. Data source A looks fine, and offers possibilities for 
analyzing gender income inequality and inequalities within the public and private 
sector. However, the series starts from 1993, thus not including the very tumultuous 
first two years of transition (1991 and 1992); also, it includes only data on withheld 
PIT and not on final PIT. Data source B includes a sample of all taxpayers, so that 
wage earners (working full time) would have to be extracted – somehow. Also, 
employment in the public or private sector can not be ascertained, as there is no 
“matching” of these data with data from the statistical registry of the active 
population. On the positive side, these series start with 1991 and also have data on 
final PIT paid. Data source C appears to be “information-poorest”, as it does not 
include two quite distinct groups of employees. Also, there is no distinction with 
regard to gender, and it omits some important income sources of wage-earners – such 
                                                 
1 Sickness allowances from the 31st day on are paid by the National Health Insurance Institute. 
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as allowance for annual vacation and income from contractual work. A further 
disadvantage is that data source C does not contain annual data but only data for a 
given month (September) of each year. In view of these shortcomings, we have opted 
for an analysis of income inequality based on data sources A and B. 
 
 
3. A Comparison of Data Sources: Employees and Wages 
 
The official data on number of employees, published in the annual Statistical 
Yearbooks of the Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia includes all 
employees2. Data source A is somewhat more restrictive, as it covers only employees 
who (1) worked full time, i.e. at least 36 hours per week and (2) were employed with 
the same employer throughout the year. With regard to data source B, the total 
number of employees is estimated from the sample. First, employees in the sample of 
taxpayers for personal income tax are extracted using the following criteria: (1) wage 
or wage compensation (sick-leave, vacation leave etc.) is greater than zero and (2) 
allowance for annual vacation is greater than zero. Both criteria have to be fulfilled. 
What is the significance of including the allowance for annual vacation as the second 
criterion? This allowance is actually a mandatory fringe benefit, to which all 
employees are entitled. The minimum annual amount is negotiated between the trade 
unions and the employer association, and stipulated in collective agreements3. This 
disbursement is in fact “quasi-mandatory” also for employers who are not members of 
the employer association. If an employee works less than full time, he receives a 
proportionate share of the minimum annual amount4. Similarly, if the employee 
works with a given employer for three months in a given years, he is entitled to 3/12 
of the minimum annual amount of the vacation allowance. 
                                                
 
We label the estimated number of employees, based on the extraction from the sample 
(data source B) and according to the upper two criteria as “B1”. This estimate is 
clearly an estimate of all employees, part-time and full-time. How do we extract full-
time employees from our sample of taxpayers? In view of the explanations stated 
above, the following criteria are imposed: (1) wage or wage compensation is greater 
than zero and (2) allowance for annual vacation is greater than the minimum annual 
amount. The estimated number of employees based on the extraction from the sample 
(data source B) and according to the upper two criteria is labelled “B2”. Obviously, 
criteria which lead to B2 are more restrictive than criteria leading to B1. However, it 
must be noted that the stricter criterion (for amount of annual vacation allowance) 
does not necessarily “weed out” all part-time employees, as some categories of part-
time workers are entitled to the full annual amount of vacation allowance. The 
 
2 Since 2005 these data also include owners of firms (actually, one-person firms) who are not insured as 
self-employed persons. In fact, these persons receive a wage (salary) paid by the owner, i.e. 
themselves. 
3 There is additional “legal muscle” to the collective agreements, as – starting from 1994 – disbursed 
amounts of this allowance higher than the minimum amount could not be deducted as expenses for the 
corporate income tax and – starting from 1998 – amounts higher than the minimum amount were also 
subject to payment of social contributions. 
4 However, persons employed part-time due to disability are partially wage-compensated by the 
Institute for Pension and Disability Insurance (IPDI). These persons are entitled to the full minimum 
annual amount of the vacation allowance. There are some 10 to 15 thousand part-time employees that 
receive partial compensation from the IPDI – the number varies according to the year (period 1991-
2005).  
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number of employees according to the SORS Statistical Yearbook and according to 
data source A and the two series (B1 and B2) derived from data source B are shown in 
table 1. 
 
Table 1. Number of employees according to different data sources, 1991–2005 
 
Year Statistical Yearbook A B1 B2 as a share of the official number of employees 
1991 746,041 0.881 0.868 
1992 692,079 0.901 0.898 
1993 665,568 0.788 0.962 0.892 
1994 647,336 0.798 0.978 0.933 
1995 641,952 0.831 0.997 0.886 
1996 634,651 0.831 1.000 0.926 
1997 651,226 0.810 0.976 0.893 
1998 652,480 0.836 0.976 0.898 
1999 670,971 0.840 0.964 0.890 
2000 683,042 0.841 0.950 0.868 
2001 694,817 0.840 0.956 0.888 
2002 697,850 0.830 0.972 0.901 
2003 699,146 0.815 0.980 0.910 
2004 702,647 0.828 0.990 0.916 
2005 731,597 0.814 
 
Note: The estimated standard error of the estimated number of employees for series B1 and B2 is not 
provided. For all these annual estimates, it is less than 3,000. 
 
The series presented in table 1 deserve at least a brief comment. Series A is clearly the 
most restrictive, as it excludes not only employees not employed full-time, but also 
employees that changed jobs in a given year. The series B1 ought to include all 
employees – except possibly those whose income is less than the (admittedly low) 
standard personal exemption in the PIT law. It is consistently lower than the official 
count of employees, provided by the Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia. 
Possible explanations are that either (a) the official count of employees by the 
Statistical Office is consistently over-estimating the actual number of employees that 
are receiving wages and wage-related allowances or (b) a number of registered 
employees receive wages (and wage-related allowances) in cash, and are thus “below 
the PIT radar screen”, meaning that their registered incomes are less than the standard 
personal PIT exemption. In other words, they are not obliged to file an income tax 
return. 
 
It is noteworthy that the discrepancy between the official count of employees and the 
number of employees from series B1 is particularly large in the “cataclysmic” first 
two years of transition, i.e. in 1991 and 1992. Slovenia declared independence in 
1991, followed by the collapse of (hitherto very strong) trade with other Yugoslavian 
republics. There is evidence that the official count of employees in these years is 
inflated; one is reminded of Gogol’s masterpiece “Dead souls”. Circumstantial 
evidence suggests that quite a few employees did not receive wage compensation at 
that time, a not unknown phenomenon also in other Central and Eastern European 
countries. Most of these employees received food coupons and other benefits-in-kind, 
and thus evaded the PIT net. So, some were working but received food coupons; some 
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were not working but were still considered employed as they were on the “waiting 
list”, waiting for demand and firm orders to pick up. 
 
The difference between series B1 and B2 in recent years (at least since 1996) is some 
50 thousand employees, and this difference can be ascribed to part-time employees. 
As already stated, even series B2 contains some part-time employees (who receive the 
full minimum amount of vacation allowance); their number is some 10 to 15 
thousand. This gives the estimated total number of part-time workers at 60 to 65 
thousand, quite close to official figures5. 
 
What about wages? The computed average wage from series A and series B1 and B2 
is presented in table 2, as a fraction of the official average wage, published by the 
Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia. The official average wage is based on a 
somewhat restricted set of employees. Thus, only employees employed full time 
during the whole year are taken into account. Furthermore, in 1991 all employees at 
private enterprises and employees with the self-employed were not taken into account. 
During the period 1992–2004 the set was somewhat expanded, so that larger private 
enterprises (with 3 or more employees) were included. Since 2005 all private 
enterprises are included, so that the only “excluded” category are employees with the 
self-employed6. Not surprisingly, the estimated average wage based on series B1 and 
B2 is lower, as the excluded category in the official computation of the average wage 
– employees with the self-employed – typically has very low wages. It is widely held 
that these employees receive a large share of their income in cash. Quite 
understandably, the average wage from series B2 is higher than the average wage 
from series B1; and is close to the official figure for the average wage.  
 
Table 2. Average gross wage according to different data sources, 1991–2005 
(in Tolars) 
 
Year Statistical Yearbook A B1 B2 as a share of the official average gross wage 
1991   16,823 0.983 0.989 
1992   51,044 0.971 0.974 
1993   75,432 1.027 0.993 1.029 
1994   94,618 0.999 0.960 0.986 
1995 111,996 0.972 0.949 0.998 
1996 129,125 0.957 0.950 0.986 
1997 144,251 0.939 0.936 0.974 
1998 158,069 0.963 0.938 0.969 
1999 173,245 0.961 0.943 0.980 
2000 191,669 0.964 0.947 0.986 
2001 214,561 0.961 0.936 0.972 
2002 235,436 0.966 0.943 0.979 
2003 253,200 0.982 0.940 0.981 
2004 267,571 0.977 0.942 0.984 
2005 277,279 0.993 
 
                                                 
5 See Employment in Europe 2005, European Commission, Employment and Social Affairs, Bruxelles. 
6 In 2005, there were some 65 thousand employees with the self-employed. 
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Regardless of the series – official, A, B1 or B2 – the growth of the average real wage 
was quite strong, as seen from figure 1, which is base on the official data from the 
Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of Slovenia. 
 
Figure 1. Average real gross wage and number of employees, 1991–2005 
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4. Income Sources of Wage Earners  
 
For the analysis of income inequality we will use data source A and data source B1. 
We decompose the Gini coefficient of income inequality using the well-known 
formula first derived by Rao (1969): 
 
 k kG s C=∑ , 
 
where G is the Gini coefficient, sk is the share of income source k in total income, and 
Ck is the coefficient of concentration of income source k. The decomposition is based 
on series A, with the income shares presented in table 3 and the concentration 
coefficients presented in table 4. 
 
As seen from table 3, wages, wage compensations and cost reimbursements accounted 
for some 90 percent of gross income of wage earners, with the vacation allowance 
trailing second, accounting for some 5 percent of their gross income. Most of the 
changes in the income structure can be explained by administrative changes and/or 
changes in the PIT code. For example, up to 1993, wage compensation for maternity 
leave was included in the income source Wages, wage compensation and cost 
reimbursements; the employer paid the amount and was later reimbursed by the social 
insurance institution. Since 1994, these compensations are paid directly by a social 
insurance institution (Centre for social work) and are included in Compensations paid 
by other social insurance institutions; that is why we observe a fairly large increase in 
this income category in 1994 and 1995. Another example: hidden beneath the 
assuming title Royalties and income from property rights is form of active (labour) 
income, a niche for the well-off wage-earners; it was quite attractive due to very 
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favourable PIT treatment. This tax “treat” was (finally!) clamped down in the 2004 
PIT law (effective from 2005), resulting in a virtually extinguishing of this income 
source in 2005. Also, due to stricter tax regulations and rules, this income source is 
now mostly included in Income from contractual work, and that is probably why 
Income from contractual work experienced such an increase in 2005. Similarly, the 
larger share of income from capital in 2005 (amounting to some 2 per cent of gross 
income of wage earners) was doubtlessly caused by new inclusions of capital income 
in the tax base, according to the 2004 PIT law. 
 
The values of concentration coefficients conform to our expectations. The low value 
for vacation allowance is due to the fact that not many employers would wish to 
disburse allowances higher than the minimum amount; they would be severely 
penalized with higher taxation. In other words, employees receive very similar 
amounts of this fringe benefit. The income category Severance pay for retirement, 
awards, solidarity payments and other wage-related payments of course does not 
include many “solidarity” elements. The largest individual item in this category are 
(quite possibly) fees for attendance of the meetings of various supervisory boards. The 
large concentration coefficients for Income from contractual work, and Royalties and 
income from property rights (which, as we explained, is actually labour income) 
shows that the well-off have ample means to supplement their already high regular 
wages and salaries. The income source Pensions and compensations paid by the 
Institute for Pension and Disability Insurance also deserves attention. This income 
source includes partial income compensations for employees with disability. After the 
passage of the 1999 pension reform, the generosity of these benefits considerably 
decreased, particularly for new entrants. However, legal provisions were being 
applied only starting in 2003, and seriously “kicking-in” only in 2005. This could 
explain the large decrease of this concentration coefficient in recent years. 
 
Table 3. Structure of gross income of wage earners, taxable persons for PIT, 1993–2005 (series A) 
 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Total 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
Wages, wage compensations and 
cost reimbursements 0.9093 0.9053 0.8878 0.8809 0.8784 0.8864 0.8906 0.8952 0.8962 0.8970 0.8980 0.8928 0.8881 
Fringe benefits 0.0023 0.0039 0.0040 0.0046 0.0058 0.0043 0.0043 0.0040 0.0035 0.0033 0.0032 0.0030 0.0048 
Allowance for annual vacation 0.0554 0.0502 0.0532 0.0557 0.0537 0.0486 0.0469 0.0447 0.0442 0.0452 0.0446 0.0446 0.0443 
Severance pay for retirement, 
awards, solidarity payments and 
other wage-related payments 0.0029 0.0026 0.0041 0.0047 0.0042 0.0039 0.0044 0.0039 0.0043 0.0036 0.0043 0.0044 
Pensions and compensations paid 
by the IPDI 0.0046 0.0042 0.0046 0.0048 0.0053 0.0052 0.0053 0.0054 0.0057 0.0059 0.0052 0.0057 0.0042 
Compensations paid by other 
social insurance institutions 0.0008 0.0049 0.0145 0.0144 0.0146 0.0140 0.0132 0.0131 0.0140 0.0128 0.0128 0.0129 0.0136 
Income from contractual work 0.0086 0.0075 0.0075 0.0077 0.0081 0.0075 0.0074 0.0075 0.0074 0.0073 0.0073 0.0068 0.0126 
Cadastral and self-employment 
income 0.0033 0.0047 0.0044 0.0040 0.0040 0.0036 0.0037 0.0032 0.0032 0.0038 0.0038 0.0042 0.0062 
Income from capital, property and 
capital gains 0.0054 0.0040 0.0082 0.0103 0.0127 0.0122 0.0114 0.0104 0.0105 0.0110 0.0105 0.0127 0.0209 
Royalties and income from 
property rights 0.0102 0.0125 0.0133 0.0136 0.0128 0.0139 0.0133 0.0122 0.0113 0.0095 0.0109 0.0129 0.0009 
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Table 4. Gini coefficient and concentration coefficients for income sources, wage earners, 1993–2005 (series A) 
 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Gini coefficient 
Total 0.2815 0.2854 0.2948 0.2989 0.3022 0.3054 0.3128 0.3120 0.3138 0.3098 0.3109 0.3082 0.3078 
Concentration coefficients 
Wages, wage compensations and 
cost reimbursements 0.2797 0.2845 0.2970 0.2999 0.3016 0.3025 0.3092 0.3096 0.3117 0.3075 0.3083 0.3030 0.3023 
Fringe benefits 0.5812 0.4848 0.4849 0.4760 0.5484 0.6520 0.6571 0.6871 0.6632 0.6852 0.6966 0.7137 0.6578 
Allowance for annual vacation 0.1305 0.0967 0.0635 0.0708 0.0783 0.0712 0.0869 0.0573 0.0547 0.0694 0.0611 0.0617 0.0629 
Severance pay for retirement, 
awards, solidarity payments and 
other wage-related payments 0.4993 0.6029 0.6226 0.5703 0.6622 0.6570 0.6942 0.7453 0.7370 0.7655 0.6565 0.7652 
Pensions and compensations paid 
by the IPDI 0.2087 0.2005 0.2172 0.1982 0.1965 0.1785 0.1642 0.1767 0.1787 0.1657 0.1162 0.1011 –0.0929 
Compensations paid by other 
social insurance institutions –0.1201 0.0122 0.0484 0.0591 0.0734 0.0931 0.1228 0.1249 0.1552 0.1554 0.1725 0.1662 0.2025 
Income from contractual work 0.5202 0.5736 0.6001 0.6238 0.5798 0.6377 0.6818 0.6696 0.6968 0.6883 0.7169 0.7113 0.7778 
Cadastral and self-employment 
income 0.2329 0.2464 0.2733 0.2830 0.3302 0.3209 0.3237 0.3985 0.4199 0.3858 0.4301 0.4284 0.4481 
Income from capital, property and 
capital gains 0.7822 0.7624 0.7081 0.6918 0.6798 0.6777 0.7063 0.7114 0.7198 0.7353 0.7222 0.7594 0.6879 
Royalties and income from 
property rights 0.8144 0.8256 0.8253 0.8233 0.8265 0.8432 0.8444 0.8362 0.8393 0.8208 0.8318 0.8441 0.7924 
 
 
5. Income Inequality 
 
What has been happening to income inequality? Do different data-sets reveal different 
trends? The analysis of income inequality at the household level shows that there have 
not been any major changes in income inequality in Slovenia since 1993. As a matter-
of-fact, the inequality of household disposable income (measured by the Gini 
coefficient) was even somewhat lower in the early 2000s as compared to the early 
1990s7. In order to explore income inequality for wage-earners, we use two data 
sources – source A and source B1; recall that source A is considerably more 
restrictive than source B1. Tables 5 and 6 show the Gini coefficient of income 
inequality for wage-earners based on series A and series B1, respectively. These 
tables also show the concentration coefficients and income shares of relevant 
“constituent” elements of gross income: PIT, employee social contributions and net 
income. Recall that there are two important differences between series A and series 
B1: (1) series A includes only wage-earners who have worked full-time during the 
year and remained at the same employer, whereas series B1 contains all wage-earners 
– full-time and part-time, as well as those who have not been regularly working 
during the given year and (2) series A contains only data on withheld PIT, whereas 
series B1 also contains data on final PIT paid. This also means that net income in 
table 5 actually refers to income after employee social contributions and withheld PIT. 
 
The trends in income inequality – as measured by the Gini coefficient – are similar in 
both series; increases during the first half of the 1990s, followed by little change, 
except for the rather large increase in 1999. Series B1 also covers the early years of 
transition, which show a very large increase in the Gini coefficient of income 
inequality in a short span of only two years – from 0.263 in 1991 to 0.292 in 1993. 
 
Table 5a. Income shares of gross income, withheld PIT, social contributions and 
“net” income, series A 
 
Year Income share of gross income 
Income share of 
withheld PIT 
Income share of 
social contributions 
Income share of 
“net” income 
1993 1.000 0.140 0.218 0.642 
1994 1.000 0.142 0.205 0.654 
1995 1.000 0.143 0.200 0.658 
1996 1.000 0.146 0.198 0.656 
1997 1.000 0.145 0.198 0.657 
1998 1.000 0.147 0.202 0.652 
1999 1.000 0.148 0.202 0.649 
2000 1.000 0.150 0.204 0.647 
2001 1.000 0.150 0.204 0.646 
2002 1.000 0.151 0.204 0.645 
2003 1.000 0.152 0.204 0.644 
2004 1.000 0.152 0.203 0.645 
2005 1.000 0.142 0.201 0.657 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 This has been shown in Stanovnik and Čok (2008). 
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Table 5b. The Gini coefficient and the concentration coefficients for withheld PIT, 
social contributions and “net” income, series A 
 
Year Gini coefficient for gross income 
Concentration 
coefficient for 
withheld PIT 
Concentration 
coefficient for social 
contributions 
Concentration 
coefficient for “net” 
income 
1993 0.282 0.389 0.279 0.259 
1994 0.285 0.464 0.282 0.248 
1995 0.295 0.472 0.293 0.257 
1996 0.299 0.476 0.295 0.261 
1997 0.302 0.480 0.297 0.265 
1998 0.305 0.485 0.302 0.266 
1999 0.313 0.492 0.309 0.273 
2000 0.312 0.490 0.310 0.272 
2001 0.314 0.491 0.312 0.273 
2002 0.310 0.486 0.308 0.269 
2003 0.311 0.486 0.309 0.270 
2004 0.308 0.480 0.303 0.269 
2005 0.308 0.514 0.304 0.264 
 
The Gini coefficient for series B1 is consistently higher than the Gini coefficient for 
series A, due to the fact that the population of wage-earners in series B1 is more 
heterogeneous and includes not only wage earners working part-time, but also wage-
earners who have not worked the whole year. Both series seem to have peaked in 
1999, with the series A even experiencing a very mild downward trend since 1999, 
whereas the series B1 has not yet demonstrated any clear upward or downward trend, 
as seen from figure 2. However, we must reiterate that the series B1 is based on a 
(admittedly large!) sample, and that we do not provide standard errors of these 
estimates. 
 
Table 6a. Income shares of gross income, PIT, social contributions and net income, 
series B1 
 
Year Income share of gross income Income share of PIT
Income share of 
social contributions 
Income share of 
net income 
1991 1.000 0.149 0.229 0.622 
1992 1.000 0.147 0.226 0.627 
1993 1.000 0.148 0.217 0.635 
1994 1.000 0.139 0.203 0.658 
1995 1.000 0.142 0.197 0.661 
1996 1.000 0.144 0.196 0.660 
1997 1.000 0.144 0.196 0.661 
1998 1.000 0.141 0.200 0.660 
1999 1.000 0.143 0.201 0.656 
2000 1.000 0.143 0.201 0.656 
2001 1.000 0.141 0.202 0.656 
2002 1.000 0.144 0.202 0.654 
2003 1.000 0.143 0.202 0.655 
2004 1.000 0.145 0.201 0.654 
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Table 6b. The Gini coefficient and the concentration coefficients for PIT, social 
contributions and net income, series B1 
 
Year Gini coefficient for gross income 
Concentration 
coefficient for PIT 
Concentration 
coefficient for social 
contributions 
Concentration 
coefficient for net 
income 
1991 0.263 0.336 0.258 0.247 
1992 0.284 0.369 0.281 0.265 
1993 0.292 0.382 0.292 0.271 
1994 0.298 0.490 0.298 0.257 
1995 0.300 0.492 0.300 0.259 
1996 0.307 0.503 0.306 0.265 
1997 0.309 0.509 0.306 0.267 
1998 0.308 0.507 0.306 0.266 
1999 0.321 0.533 0.319 0.275 
2000 0.322 0.536 0.321 0.276 
2001 0.316 0.513 0.318 0.273 
2002 0.322 0.525 0.323 0.277 
2003 0.320 0.511 0.318 0.279 
2004 0.324 0.527 0.323 0.280 
 
Can we “explain” the large increase in the Gini during the first years of transition? 
Various studies for different countries have shown that, in the early years of 
transition, the returns to education have increased considerably. As demonstrated by 
Oražem and Vodopivec (1995) and Stanovnik (1997), this also applies to Slovenia. In 
other words, the wage compression characteristic for the socialist years has 
“dissolved” during the early transition years, resulting in a large increase in the 
dispersion of wages. 
 
Figure 2. Value of the Gini coefficient according to the two data sources 
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Could the large increase in inequality also be explained by changes in the institutional 
arrangements for wage-setting? Slovenia has a very strong tradition of tripartite 
consensus-seeking arrangements, with wage-setting being negotiated through social 
partners – the trade unions and employer associations, with the government stepping 
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in if deemed necessary. These negotiations result in documents providing guidelines 
for wage-setting, disbursement of fringe benefits etc. – the most important ones being 
social agreements and collective contracts8. Social agreements are general documents, 
covering all employees, whereas collective contracts are more specific and cover 
industrial branches or groups of branches. These contracts are occasionally 
supplemented by additional agreements on wage policy. As if this were not enough, 
the government frequently steps in, enacting special laws on the enforcement of these 
agreements. Of particular relevance is a law, enacted in mid-1995 with a long-winded 
title “On Enforcing the Agreement on Wage Policy and Other Payments to Employees 
and the Social Agreement for 1995, and the Maximum and Minimum Wage”. This 
law actually marked the introduction of the minimum wage, which was initially set at 
some 40 per cent of the average wage9. 
 
What about PIT and its impact on the inequality of after-tax income? As seen from 
tables 5 and 6, the increases in inequality of net incomes of wage-earners is much less 
pronounced than the increase in inequality of gross incomes, due to the strong 
progressivity of the PIT. PIT was first introduced in 1991, but its progressivity was 
considerably increased in 1994, following the new PIT legislation passed in late 1993. 
Progressivity was further increased in 2005, due to the new PIT act passed in April 
2004. These changes are clearly visible in the large increases in the PIT concentration 
coefficient in these years. Also to be noted is the large increase in the PIT 
concentration coefficient in 1999 for series B1, which is based on actual PIT paid. In 
May 2000 a law “On Extraordinary Decrease of Tax Liabilities” was passed, 
significantly reducing the PIT liability for low-income earners and thus increasing the 
PIT progressivity. It was applied ex post for 1999 and ex ante for 2000. We just note 
that this was several months before parliamentary elections. 
 
Let us now briefly analyse the income shares accruing to income quintiles. These are 
presented in table 7 (for series A) and table 8 (for series B1). Though the share of 
gross income accruing to the bottom 20 per cent of wage earners has somewhat 
decreased (for both series) in the early 2000s as compared to the early 1990s, the 
trends in net income would certainly be different. Without trying to give too much 
weight to “circumstantial” evidence, we note that for series A the share of the bottom 
20 per cent of wage earners has been increasing since 1999, coinciding with a steady 
increase in the value of the minimum wage – from 40 per cent of average wage in 
1999 to 43 per cent of the average wage in 2005. There is no such trend for the share 
of the bottom 20 per cent in series B1; for these heterogeneous low-income wage 
earners the concept of minimum wage is less relevant than for full-time employees. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8 Here one must mention the fact that not all workers are covered by collective contracts; in the private 
sector some 5 per cent of all employees are covered under individual wage contracts. These employees 
receive considerably higher wages than those employed on collective contracts. 
9 Prior to 1995, the term used to describe the minimum wage was “guaranteed wage” (zajamčena 
plača). Though legally prescribed, it was so low, i.e. poorly indexed, that it has lost any meaning for 
labour remuneration. 
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Table 7. Gross income shares, series A 
 
Year Lowest 20% Quintiles 2 – 4 Highest 20% Highest 5% Highest 1% 
1993 9.60 52.27 38.13 14.83 4.69 
1994 9.66 51.65 38.69 15.76 5.09 
1995 9.33 51.40 39.27 16.05 5.08 
1996 9.34 51.00 39.66 16.37 5.27 
1997 9.16 51.02 39.82 16.50 5.35 
1998 9.21 50.58 40.21 16.82 5.66 
1999 9.01 50.18 40.81 17.24 5.84 
2000 9.06 50.27 40.67 17.05 5.76 
2001 9.16 49.93 40.91 17.03 5.75 
2002 9.25 50.12 40.63 16.73 5.69 
2003 9.23 49.90 40.87 16.75 5.70 
2004 9.42 49.73 40.85 16.69 5.72 
2005 9.44 49.79 40.77 16.63 5.81 
 
Table 8. Gross income shares, series B1 
 
Year Lowest 20% Quintiles 2 – 4 Highest 20% Highest 5% Highest 1% 
1991 9.98 53.64 36.38 13.76 4.37 
1992 9.34 52.77 37.89 15.07 4.98 
1993 9.10 52.41 38.49 15.43 5.03 
1994 9.01 51.82 39.17 16.28 5.41 
1995 9.09 51.37 39.54 16.45 5.26 
1996 9.06 50.71 40.23 16.93 5.60 
1997 9.08 50.5 40.42 17.15 5.67 
1998 9.16 50.54 40.30 17.25 6.07 
1999 8.86 49.75 41.39 17.98 6.14 
2000 8.87 49.7 41.43 18.12 6.44 
2001 9.04 49.97 40.99 17.28 5.83 
2002 8.93 49.64 41.43 17.63 6.02 
2003 8.85 49.84 41.31 17.42 6.05 
2004 8.82 49.54 41.64 17.74 6.26 
 
The top quintile has been increasing its share, in both series A and B1. Thus, for series 
A, in the 1993–2004 period the top quintile of wage earners increased their income 
share from 38.13 to 40.85 per cent, representing an increase of 2.73 percentage points. 
The increase for series B1 in the same period was from 38.49 to 41.64 – an increase of 
3.15 percentage points. As shown in figure 3 (which depicts data from series B1), 
most of this increase is actually picked up by the top 5 per cent of wage-earners. 
Proceeding yet further, one observes that the top 1 per cent of wage-earners have 
received a disproportionate share of the increase accruing to the top 5 per cent. 
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Figure 3. Increases in income shares at the top of the income distribution, series B1 
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6. Concluding Remarks 
 
Our analysis was focused on income inequality of wage earners. Of course, such an 
analysis is partial in that it does not cover incomes of other labour active persons 
(such as the self-employed). To provide a final verdict on what has been happening 
with income inequality, the analysis of incomes at the household level would be 
relevant, using household current disposable income as the income measure. In spite 
of these limitations, several important conclusions do emerge. Income inequality of 
wage-earners (based on the Gini coefficient) sharply increased in the first years of 
transition, followed by more modest increases up to 1999. It seems that for full-time 
wage-earners (series A) income inequality was on a mild downward sloping trend 
since 1999. As for the more heterogeneous group of all wage earners (series B1), it 
appears that income inequality has levelled-off since 1999. We would not want to 
speculate on what might happen in the future. 
 
An analysis of the income shares across income quintiles and percentiles shows that 
much action has been going on not at the top, but at the very top of the income 
distribution, i.e. the top 5 per cent and top 1 per cent of wage earners. In other words, 
the increasing share of income accruing to the top 20 per cent of wage-earners has – 
to a large degree – been picked up by the top 5 per cent and top 1 per cent of wage 
earners. Though the bottom quintile, i.e. the lowest 20 per cent of wage earners were 
receiving a somewhat lower share of gross income in the 2000s as compared to the 
beginning of transition (year 1991), due to increased progressivity of PIT during the 
1990s and 2000s, their share in net income has – if anything – increased. 
 
We have not presented any results concerning wage-earners in the public and private 
sector. Here, one is reminded of the fractal nature of the increase in income inequality, 
in that this increase is observable even when one considers smaller groups. Thus, the 
public and private sector display similar trends in income inequality, though income 
inequality of wage-earners in the public sector is smaller. 
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